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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
The arguments proposed by the dissent, that the holding of Lockridge
would encourage a "general search" and provide an incentive for law en-
forcement officials to violate an individual's constitutional rights, clearly
reflect the long-standing rationale of the exclusionary rule. The under-
lying effect of the holding in Lockridge, however, is to restrict the exclu-
sionary rule and allow courts to engage in making policy choices even
though the binding choices of policy have already been made by the United
States Supreme Court in Weeks v. United States(' and Mapp v. Ohio.62
The driving force of Mapp v. OhioP3 was a "belief of the majority in the
utter emptiness of the right assimilated by due process in Wolf without
the remedy of exclusion."' 4 When a state court is free to make a policy
choice and thereby restrict the exclusionary rule, the remedy becomes al-
most non-existent.
HOWARD J. LEVINE
CRIMINAL LAW-VOLUNTARY ADMISSIONS HELD ADMISSIBLE EVEN
THOUGH OBTAINED BY MEANS OF INTERROGATION IN ABSENCE OF COUNSEL.
In January, 1965, the defendant was arrested for murder and taken
to the police station where he was permitted to confer with his attorney.
When the attorney left the room, indicating to the detective on duty to
"watch" the defendant while he went some place in the building, the de-
tective asked defendant, "[D]id you ever think it would wind up like this?"'
The defendant replied affirmatively and commenced to describe the crime
in detail. The incriminating admissions were allowed into evidence at
trial. The defendant was convicted in New York County Supreme Court
of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The defendant
moved on appeal for reversal and a new trial on the grounds that once
an attorney has entered a criminal proceeding, admissions made in his
absence constitute a denial of the right to counsel and are therefore in-
admissible. The conviction was affirmed by the appellate division.2 The
New York Court of Appeals affirmed in a five to two decision. Held, vol-
untary admissions made to a police officer are not inadmissible merely
because they were made in response to questioning in the absence of de-
fendant's counsel. People v. Robles, 27 N.Y.2d 155, 263 N.E.2d 304, 314
N.Y.S.2d 793 (1970).
61. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
62. 36,7 U.S. 643 (1961).
63. Id.
64. Wolf, A Survey of the Expanded Exclusionary Rule, 32 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
193, 212 (1963).
1. People v. Robles, 27 N.Y.2d 155, 158, 263 N.E.2d 304, 305, 314 N.Y.S.2d 793, 794
(1970).
2. People v Robles, 32 App. Div. 2d 741, 800 N.Y.S.2d 510 (Ist Dep't 1969).
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* The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
the accused in a criminal prosecution the right to counsel 3 and the four-
teenth amendment makes this safeguard applicable in state proceedings.4
Independent of these constitutional guarantees, many states, including New
York, have statutory and state constitutional provisions providing a right
to counsel.5 These constitutional and statutory safeguards have been ex-
tensively interpreted by case law. Beginning with Powell v. Alabama,6 the
sixth amendment right to counsel has undergone considerable develop-
ment. In Powell, the United States Supreme Court held that this sixth
amendment guarantee is afforded to indigent defendants in capital cases.
The development initiated by Powell was extended, in Gideon v. Wain-
wright,7 to indigent defendants charged with less serious felonies. Both
Powell and Gideon emphasized the right to counsel in the post-arraign-
ment and trial stages of the proceeding, leaving uncharted the scope of
defendant's sixth amendment right prior to arraignment. Yet pre-arraign-
ment is a critical phase with regard to the right to counsel. If the exercise
of this right is delayed until after arraignment, the defendant's case may
well have suffered irreparable damage. The Supreme Court recognized
-this in Escobedo v. Illinois,8 in holding that the right to counsel attaches
"when the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory-when its focus
is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a confession. . . ."9 Where
Escobedo permitted an accused to have counsel present during custodial
interrogation, Miranda v. Arizona'0 promulgated fifth and sixth amend-
ment guidelines to be used during such interrogations. The Miranda rul-
ing required that an accused be advised of his right to remain silent; his
right to the presence of an attorney during interrogation; that such rights
be afforded throughout the interrogation; and that if they are waived, the
validity of such waiver must be demonstrated by the prosecution at trial.
New York law has had its own line of development with regard to the
right to counsel. In the leading case of People v. Donovan," the Court
3. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XrV.
5. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6; N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §§ 8, 188, 308, 699 (McKinney
1958).
6. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
7. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See also Betts v. Brady, 516 U.S. 455 (1942); Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
8. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). See also Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958), an
earlier case considering this aspect of the right to counsel problem.
9. 378 U.S. at 492.
10. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Though Miranda dominates this area of the law its
relevance to the instant case is limited, for in Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719
(1966), the Court held that the Miranda guidelines are not to be available to those
whose trials commenced prior to June 13, 1966. Nevertheless Miranda does present a
constitutional standard with which state cases can be compared.
11. 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963).
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of Appeals suppressed a written confession taken after police had refused
to allow the suspect to consult with counsel during a period of illegal de-
tention. The court indicated that the practice of prohibiting the accused
from conferring with counsel constituted a violation of his fifth and sixth
amendment rights. With Donovan serving as a cornerstone, the court con-
tinued to define the right to counsel. Statements made to police in the
absence of counsel have been excluded when an attorney is deliberately
misdirected by police to a place other than the place of the client's deten-
tion in order to delay consultation, and is denied access to the client until
a confession has been taken. 2 This rule has also been held to extend to
situations where an attorney's request to the police that no statement be
taken from the accused in his absence be respected.' 3 Further, in People
v. Vella14 the court held that where the police knew that the accused had
retained counsel, interrogation of the accused "in the absence of and with-
out notice to" the attorney 5 violated his right to counsel.
The delineation of the content of the right to counsel in New York,
as initiated in Donovan, was seemingly completed in People v. Arthur.0
There, defendant Arthur, detained on a charge of attempted murder, made
a written confession on the night of his arrest, and also made incriminating
oral admissions the following morning. On both occasions the statements
were taken in the absence of defendant's counsel. Arthur appealed from
his conviction on the ground that the statements were inadmissible because
counsel had not been present during the interrogation. The court agreed
with Arthur's contention and stated categorically that:
Once an attorney enters the proceeding, the police may not ques-
tion the defendant in the absence of counsel unless there is an
affirmative waiver, in the presence of the attorney, of the defen-
dant's right to counsel (People v. Vella, 21 N.Y.2d 249, [287 N.Y.S.
2d 369, 234 N.E.2d 422]). There is no requirement that the at-
torney or the defendant request the police to respect this right of
the defendant.'1
The law concerning the right to counsel, reflected in the progression
from Donovan to Arthur, is qualified by several other Court of Appeals
decisions. Among them is People v. McKie,'8 where defendant McKie made
12. People v. Failla, 14 N.Y.2d 178, 199 N.E.2d 366, 250 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1964).
13. People v. Gunner, 15 N.Y.2d 226, 205 N.E.2d 852, 257 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1965).
14. 21 N.Y.2d 249, 234 N.E.2d 422, 287 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1967).
15. Id. at 251, 234 N.E.2d at 422, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 369.
16. 22 N.Y.2d 325, 239 N.E.2d 537, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1968).
17. Id. at 329, 289 N.E.2d at 539, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 666. The rule of Arthur has been
cited and applied in People v. Miles, 23 N.Y.2d 527, 245 N.E.2d 688, 297 N.Y.S.2d 913
(1969), and People v. Paulin, 25 N.Y.2d 445, 255 N.E.2d 164, 806 N.Y.S.2d 929 (1969).
18. 25 N.Y.2d 19, 250 N.E.2d 36, 302 N.Y.S.2d 534 (1969).
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incriminating statements to the police during a street corner argument.
McKie argued that since his attorney had requested the police not to ques-
tion him in his absence, the rule of Arthur made the statements inadmis-
sible. The Court distinguished Arthur and read it to apply only when the
police had taken the accused into custody or deprived him of his freedom
in some significant manner. For authority of this reading of Arthur, the
court cited Donovan, stressing ,Donovan's emphasis on the right to counsel
attaching after arrest and during detention. Dissenting, Judge Burke read
Arthur and Vella to hold that once the police are aware of the attorney-
client relationship they may not ignore it through the ruse of finding that
the accused is not yet in formal custody.19
Another qualifying case is People v. Kaye.2O Police counselled Kaye
regarding his constitutional rights immediately upon his entry into a squad
car en route to -the police station. Disregarding admonitions of his right -to
remain silent and to have his attorney present during interrogation, Kaye
spontaneously, and without interrogation, confessed to the murder of which
he was accused. The confession was admitted into evidence and the re-
sultant conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The court held
that due to the lack of interrogation, the confession was spontaneous and
therefore not the product of "custodial interrogation" within the meaning
of Miranda. Vella and Arthur were consequently held inapposite. Judges
Fuld and Burke dissented, arguing that "spontaneity" was immaterial, and
that once the police knew that counsel was in the case, no statements taken
in his absence could be admitted against defendant.
2'
In the instant case the majority opinion began by indicating that it
was bound by the trial court's conclusion of fact that defendant's state-
ments to the detective were made voluntarily and were not a product of
"custodial interrogation."22 The court then stated that the controlling
legal principle was that "not every conversation between police and ac-
cused is unlawful"23 and hence inadmissible, but rather, only those con-
versations "[in which] the questioning takes place under circumstances
19. Judge Burke found that the attorney-client relationship once made evident to
police stood independent of any determination of the accused's status. This position
appears inconsistent with the position taken by him in Robles.
20. 25 N.Y.2d 139, 250 N.E.2d 329, 303 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1969).
21. Both Arthur and Vella were cited as authority by the dissenters. And it is also
to be noted that again Judge Burke indicated a belief that once the attorney-client
relationship is made known to police, statements may not be taken in absence of
counsel; notwithstanding the finding of lack of formal custody as in McKie, or the
finding of spontaneity as in Kaye. Based on his position in Kaye and McKie, before
Robles, Judge Burke apparently believed that the right to counsel was relatively un-
conditional.
22. People v. Yukl, 25 N.Y.2d 585, 256 N.E.2d 172, 307 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1969); People
v. Leonti, 18 N.Y.2d 384, 222 N.E.2d 591, 275 N.Y.S.2d. 825 (1966).
23. 27 N.Y.2d at 158, 263 N.E.2d at 305, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 795.
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which are likely to affect substantially the individual's will to resist .... ,,24
The court thus forcefully rejected Robles' assertion that the rule of Arthur,
that once an attorney appears there can be no effective waiver in his ab-
sence,25 was controlling. This formulation was characterized by the ma-
jority, relying on their interpretation of Kaye, McKie, and People v.
Rodney P. (Anonymous) as a mere "theoretical statement of the rule."20
The majority indicated that each case should be examined to determine
the applicability of Arthur, and that only those statements which are found
to be the product of "custodial interrogation" are inadmissible when made
in the absence of counsel. The majority supported this proposition by
citing Kaye, where the defendant's statement, characterized as spontaneous,
was determined not to be the product of "custodial interrogation" and
was hence admissible; and McKie, where the defendant's statement was
admitted, since it was offered before the defendant had been taken into
custody or in any way substantially deprived of his liberty. Having thus
determined that a spontaneous statement is, by definition, not the product
of "custodial interrogation," the court reached the conclusion that Robles'
statement was not the product of "custodial interrogation." Rather it was
seen as an "impetuous unbosoming of his implication in the crime."27
This interpretation made the Robles' facts sufficiently analogous to Kaye
to allow the Robles' statement into evidence.
It is apparent that the court has used the case law to create a syllogism.
Not all statements between police and accused are unlawful-only those
statements which are found to be the product of "custodial interrogation."
A "spontaneous" statement is, by definition, not a product of "custodial
interrogation." Robles' statement was "spontaneous" and hence not the
product of "custodial interrogation." The conclusion is, therefore, that
merely because the statement was made in the absence of an attorney does
not make it inadmissible. To buttress this position the court commented:
"At all relevant times [Robles'] attorney was physically present and avail-
able to him,"'28 and to its recollection the court knew of "no prior case
where the defendant's attorney was physically present in the immediate
vicinity of his client and had prompt access to his client [that] we [have]
held that admissions made by a defendant during such time are inadmis-
sible."29
Judge Breitel, in his dissent, chose to emphasize a different aspect of
the facts. He astutely recognized that the defendant's admissions ". .. were
24. People v. Rodney P. (Anonymous), 21 N.Y.2d 1, 11, 233 N.E.2d 255, 261, 286
N.Y.S.2d 225, 234 (1967).
25. 22 N.Y.2d at 329, 239 N.E.2d at 539, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 666.
26. 27 N.Y.2d at 158, 263 N.E2d at 305, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 795.
27. Id. at 159, 263 N.E.2d at 306, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 795.
28. Id. at 159, 263 N.E.2d at 306, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 796.
29. Id. at 160, 263 N.E.2d at 306, 314 N.YS.2d at 796.
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extracted by systematic questioning following an initial sympathetic com-
ment designed to invite an outpouring of guilt-ridden confession." 30 This
circumstance, Judge Breitel argued, made Arthur applicable, for in both
cases the defendant was subjected to interrogation under almost identical
conditions, and in Arthur, the existence of such conditions was held suffi-
cient to warrant the protection of the right to counsel. Judge Breitel
asserted further, that far from being a "theoretical statement," the Arthur
rule was a logical culmination of prior law,3 ' and has since been accepted
and applied on the grounds of fundamental due process.32 The Breitel
dissent maintained that the majority's reliance on Kaye and McKie to dis-
tinguish Arthur was misplaced, for neither case departed from the Arthur
rule. In Kaye "there was not a single question asked and the defendant
without solicitation volunteered his self-inculpating story,"3' and in McKie
the accused uttered the inculpating remarks before he was in any way re-
strained by the police. This is to be contrasted with People v. Paulin,3
4
where Arthur was held controlling. In Judge Breitel's view the circum-
stances surrounding the "spontaneity" in Kaye are dearly distinguishable
from the systematic questioning in Robles; while the more appropriate
factual identification is to be made with Paulin, where the "barely-dis-
guised devious questioning.. ."35 was held to be interrogation.
Finally Judge Breitel urged that while availability of counsel and the
failure to utilize counsel may indicate that the defendant desires to answer
questions without counsel being present, the use of such an inference is
not strong enough to substitute for an explicit waiver of the right to coun-
sel. Thus, this dissent urged, the only conduct sufficiently protective of
the rights of the accused would be a waiver executed by defendant in the
presence of his attorney.
The second dissenter, Judge Fuld, stated, in a brief paragraph, that
once law enforcement officers are aware that the accused is represented by
counsel they must desist from questioning him "unless both he and his
lawyer affirmatively waive his right to counsel."3 6 As authority for his
position, Judge Fuld argued by analogy to the provisions of the American
Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 7, Disciplinary
30. Id.
31. See People v. Gunner, 15 N.Y.2d 226, 205 N.E.2d 852, 257 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1965)
People v. Falla, 14 N.Y.2d 178, 199 N.E.2d 366, 250 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1964); People v.
Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963).
32. The court, Judge Breitel pointed out, applied Arthur in two recent cases,
People v. Miles, 23 N.Y.2d 527, 245 N.E.2d 688, 297 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1969); and more
significantly in People v. Paulin, 25 N.Y.2d 445, 255 N.E.2d 164, 306 N.Y.S.2d 929 (1969).
33. 27 N.Y.2d at 161, 263 N.E.2d at 307, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 797.
34. 25 N.Y.2d 445, 255 N.E.2d 164, 306 N.Y.S.2d 929 (1969).
35. 27 N.Y.2d at 161, 263 N.E.2d at 307, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 797.
36. Id. at 162, 263 N.E.2d at 307, 314 N.YS.2d at 798.
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Rules 7-104[A][1], providing that in a civil case it would be impermissible
for one party's counsel to confer with the other party in the absence of his
counsel. Since Judge Fuld found this to be the standard observed in civil
cases, no less protection, he believed, should be afforded the accused in
criminal cases.
In evaluating the rule of the Robles case it would perhaps be most
valuable to examine the court's application of Arthur, Vella, and Kaye.
In its attempt to minimize the effect of Arthur on the instant case, it may
be asserted that the court misread Arthur. In distinguishing Arthur from
Robles the court indicated that Robles was granted immediate access to
his attorney, whereas in Arthur, the attorney was forced to wait until the
police had finished their interrogation. If this statement of the facts was
complete, then a valid distinction between the two cases would exist. The
court's description of Arthur clearly indicates a denial of the right to coun-
sel, in that police interfered with a lawyer-client consultation. In Robles,
as distinguished from Arthur, there is no evidence of police harassment;
therefore the court concluded that Arthur was not in point. It may be
argued, however, that the court's statement of the facts in Arthur was in-
complete and that the actual holding of the case was based on the omitted
facts rather than on those stated by the court. There were two different
statements ultimately held inadmissible in Arthur. First, there was the
written admission referred to by the court in Robles. This written admis-
sion was elicited during the time the attorney was unsuccessfully attempt-
ing to secure permission to confer with Arthur. Only after execution of
the written statement was Arthur's attorney permitted to confer with him.
The following morning an oral statement was taken from Arthur. In dis-
cussing the two statements the Arthur court accepted the defendant's argu-
ment that the written statement was inadmissible because all or part of it
was obtained after his attorney had requested but was denied permission
to confer with him. The court then directed its attention to the separate
issue of the oral admissions secured the following morning in the absence
of the counsel. It was in response to these admissions that the court put
forth "the rule" of Arthur that: "Once an attorney enters the proceeding,
the police may not question the defendant in the absence of counsel unless
there is an affirmative waiver, in the presence of the attorney. . . ."37 With
this consideration in mind it would seem that, at least on this point, Arthur
could not be distinguished from Robles, because in neither case was there
an effort to prevent consultation on the admission in question.
In arguing for the diminution of Arthur, the court would have been
more persuasive if it had examined the incorporation of the Vella holding
in Arthur to determine whether the Arthur court's reading and restatement
87. 22 N.Y.2d at 329, 289 N.E.2d at 589, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 666.
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of Vella was accurate. In Vella the police apparently spirited Vella away,
and subsequently took statements from him in absence of and without
notice to counsel. The Vella court interpreted this behavior as a deliberate
attempt to prevent Vella from exercising his right to counsel. Two ele-
ments were necessary for the holding: failure to notify defendant's attorney
of an intent to question and subsequent statements taken in the absence
of the attorney. There is no indication from the language of Vella that
statements elicited in the absence of counsel, taken alone, would have been
sufficient to make such statements inadmissible. If both elements of Vella
were required for a correct reading of the case, then it could be argued
that Vella should not have been relied on as it was in Arthur and further
that Arthur should not have been offered as controlling by Judge Breitel
in his dissent. There was no element of duplicity with regard to the oral
admissions in Arthur, nor was there any in Robles. The court in Robles
was thus correct in finding Arthur inapposite in that Arthur misconstrued
the law of Vella.
A second issue in the court's opinion which merits discussion is the
notion of "spontaneity" derived from Kaye and applied in Robles. The
two cases cannot be realistically compared on this issue. In Kaye the court's
interpretation that the statements were spontaneous is creditable. Kaye
was warned of his rights when he entered the police car; subsequently he
made an effective verbal waiver of his right to counsel. The incriminating
admissions followed. The only comment made by the police was that if
Kaye chose to make a statement that he start from the "beginning." The
facts in Kaye therefore can be seen to justify the description of the state-
ment made as spontaneous, for unlike Robles, Kaye had just been taken
into custody, had not yet been questioned, and the outburst did not take
place in a station house. Robles, on the other hand, had been in custody
for a number of hours, had already spent some time in a detention pen,
and his statements resulted from an initial question from a detective fol-
lowed by systematic questioning for an hour and a half. When these cases
are compared it becomes evident that Robles' statement can rot be char-
acterized as spontaneous, and thus the court's analysis is unwarranted.
Though one may not approve of the court's semantic legerdemain in
regard to spontaneity, the apparent purpose behind such a tactic is under-
standable. The fact that Miranda was not seen by this court as controlling
does not obviate the Miranda problems which existed. If the court in
Robles had found the statements the product of "custodial interrogation,"
they would have been confronted with a Miranda-type waiver problem.
The case then would have hinged on an evaluation of Robles' "waiver"
of his right to counsel. Whether or not a valid waiver could have been
demonstrated is a matter of speculation. A reading of Miranda reveals,
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however, that the precise standards for a valid waiver appear unclear.
Thus, rather than venture into a no-man's-land of ambiguity, the Court
of Appeals circumvented this difficulty by refusing to deal with Robles as a
Miranda-type problem. This is not surprising, and it may be suggested
that other jurisdictions will utilize such an approach in similar cases. The
reluctance to couch cases in Miranda terms may indicate a fundamental
wariness towards the Miranda guidelines. Apparently if the court chooses
to circumvent Miranda it will continue to scrutinize the particulars of each
case in search of instances of unfairness to the defendant. This standard
would seem to allow the court to define the scope of the right to counsel
on a case-by-case basis without disturbing the use of in-custody interroga-
tion as an investigatory tool.
Although the position adopted by the majority may, on occasion, com-
promise the effectiveness of fifth and sixth amendment guarantees, the
dissenting position, responding to this problem, created its own equally
aggravating guidelines. The dissenters urged a position even more radical
than Miranda by demanding that only a waiver executed in the presence
of defendant's counsel will suffice, whereas Miranda merely places a burden
on police to establish the validity of the waiver. The effect of adopting
the dissenters' rule may thus curtail the use of "custodial interrogation"
as an investigatory tool, for any skillful practitioner will inform his client
not to waive his rights and to remain silent38
To support the legal standards proposed in the majority and the dis-
senting opinions in Robles one can find ,two conflicting interests. Con-
fronted with widely-publicized accounts of violent crime, many feel that
life and property are pervasively threatened. They insist that this is not
the time to hamper police efforts in combatting crime; nor is it fiscally
expedient to require municipalities to expand their law enforcement agen-
cies in order to secure convictions through independent evidence collection
in lieu of convictions secured by custodial interrogation. It is argued that
society cannot afford, for the sake of respect for law and order, to allow
the conviction rate to decrease. To do so would thwart the aims of criminal
justice.
With equal confidence, their antagonists argue that police credibility
is minimal, and that "waivers" resulting from incommunicado interroga-
tion are not trustworthy. Moreover, racial attitudes seriously compromise
38. See Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59
(1949): "To subject one without counsel to questioning which may and is intended
to convict him, is a real peril to individual freedom. To bring in a lawyer means a real
peril to solution of the crime, because, under our adversary system, he deems that his
sole duty is to protect his client-guilty or innocent-and that in such a capacity he
owes no duty whatever to help society solve its crime problem. Under this conception
of criminal procedure, any lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain
terms to make no statement to police under any circumstances."
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the fairness of "custodial interrogation," since minority group members are
often victims of police abuse. This position thus leads to the conclusion
that only a mechanical rule, similar to the one proposed by the dissenters,
can give any real meaning to fifth and sixth amendment rights.
The elements of truth which exist in both positions does not make
reconciliation impossible, but rather groping and difficult. Depriving law
enforcement officials of a valuable tool of investigation is likely to have
untoward effects, while maintaining the pretense of rights which are un-
enforceable makes a mockery of the law. Unwilling, therefore, to surrender
law and order for liberty and law, the solution to the problem must rest
on the ground of delicate adjustment,3 9 refinement, and continuous evalua-
tion of the actual effects of the new rules devised.
BERNARD M. BRODSKY
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN
PAROLE REVOCATION HEARING
In 1947, a relator was convicted on a plea of guilty to a charge of
murder in the second degree in the court of general sessions and was sen-
tenced to prison for a term of from tweny years to life. He was paroled
in the summer of 1963 after having served sixteen years. In December of
1964 he was declared "delinquent" and subsequently taken into custody
in March of 1965, charged with having violated the conditions of his parole
by consorting with criminals and giving false information to his parole
supervisor. The relator admitted these charges in a revocation hearing held
before a parole court at which he was not represented by counsel. His
parole was then revoked and the board ordered him barred from parole
reconsideration for at least two years. In three subsequent appearances
before the board held for the purpose of determining eligibility for parole
release, the relator appeared without counsel and was denied release, ap-
parently on the basis of his initial violation. He -then brought an action to
redress the deprivation of asserted constitutional rights to counsel and other
procedural safeguards. The proceeding was dismissed on the ground that it
39. Because of the need foii delicate adjustment, this writer is forqed to reject
the dissenters' rule. While this position does end the problem of the trustworthiness of
a waiver, this is done without first determining whether some less drastic remedy would
.secure the desired measure of rights, without hobbling law enforcement efficiency. If
modest remedies fail, then a choice between competing considerations may be neces-
saxy; but until such time it is incumbent upon courts and legislators to make sincere
and imaginative efforts to create practices which will guarantee the reality of fifth and
sixth amendment safeguards.
